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An Act To provide for the establishment 
of Federal Reserve banks, to furnish an 
elastic currency, to afford means of redis-
counting commercial paper, to establish a 
more effective supervision of banking in 
the United States, and for other purposes.
 Federal Reserve Act, December 23, 1913.
After recurring bouts of financial panics and 
banking crises, including a particularly severe 
one in 1907, a clamor arose among policy cir-
cles and the business community that the United 
States was in need of serious banking and cur-
rency reform. Part of this reform would be the 
creation of an institution that would, when the 
system was threatened with periodic regional 
or national financial crises, provide the neces-
sary liquidity to support the banks that were in 
duress—the so-called provision of an elastic 
currency. As the opening line of the Federal 
Reserve Act clearly articulates, financial stabil-
ity took center stage in the initial mandate of the 
United States’ central bank. While the Federal 
Reserve Act defined the supervisory duties of 
the Fed, there is no mention of a price stability 
mandate in the original version of the legisla-
tion. Indeed, the word inflation does not appear 
at all in the document. A full employment mac-
roeconomic goal is not even remotely alluded to.
It is probable that in 1913, while financial 
panics were not uncommon, high inflation was 
still largely seen by the founders of the Fed as 
a relatively rare phenomenon associated with 
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wars and their immediate aftermath. Figure 1 
plots the US price level from 1775 (set equal to 
one) until 2012. In 1913 prices were only about 
20 percent higher than in 1775 and around 40 
percent lower than in 1813, during the War of 
1812. Whatever the mandates of the Federal 
Reserve, it is clear that the evolution of the price 
level in the United States is dominated by the 
abandonment of the gold standard in 1933 and 
the adoption of fiat money subsequently. One 
hundred years after its creation, consumer prices 
are about 24 times higher than what they were 
in 1913. This pattern, in varying orders of mag-
nitude, repeats itself across nearly all countries.
In the next section, we sketch how the man-
dates of the Fed have morphed over time from 
a predominantly financial stability goal at its 
outset in 1913, to facilitating fiscal financ-
ing during World War II and its aftermath, to a 
higher emphasis on inflation stabilization and 
price stability from the late 1970s until the 2007 
subprime crisis. Now, possibly, the pendulum 
is swinging back to place a greater weight on 
its initial mandate of financial stability, which 
policymakers and financial markets had come to 
take for granted during the postwar era.
Figure 1. Consumer Price Index, United States, 
1775–2012 (level, 1775 = 1)
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Historical Statistics of 
the United States, and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
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In Section II we present evidence to suggest 
that across all these regimes, whether the man-
date was financial stability, low inflation and 
full employment, or public debt monetization, 
short-term policy interest rates (prices) are usu-
ally not a sufficient statistic to characterize mon-
etary or liquidity conditions at a point in time. 
As recently stressed in Schularick and Taylor 
(2012), we emphasize credit developments 
(quantities) to supplement interest rates and 
provide a more comprehensive view of financial 
conditions.
We conclude by arguing that multiple policy 
goals call for multiple instruments. Policies, 
such as changes in reserve and margin require-
ments and a variety of credit measures that have 
been discarded as antiquated, should be a part 
of the toolkit of the central bank in the United 
States and other advanced economies. These 
instruments have continued to play a central 
role in defining monetary policy in many emerg-
ing   markets to the present day. In principle, of 
course, other regulators can and should play 
a role, but the experience of overly narrowing 
the central bank’s purview has not proved an 
entirely successful one.
I.  Targets and Instruments: 
A 100-Year Timeline
At the risk of a gross simplification, the Federal 
Reserve’s first centennial can be roughly divided 
into three subperiods. From its creation in 1913 
until the 1930s its primary mandate was financial 
stability. The second phase was an era of “fiscal 
dominance” from the outset of World War II until 
the late 1970s (the 1951 Fed–Treasury accord 
notwithstanding), when the Fed facilitated fiscal 
financing in varying degrees, albeit often in the 
name of employment. From 1979, beginning with 
an aggressive inflation stabilization plan until the 
crisis of 2007, the third phase, (an independent) 
Fed was guided by a mandate of price stability 
and macroeconomic stabilization. It is premature 
to characterize the fourth phase ushered in by the 
2007 crisis. Table 1, which shades the eras, pro-
vides highlights of this timeline and guides our 
discussion.
Our aim is not merely to recap the past but 
to draw some lessons for the future and better 
understand the present. With a cumulative out-
put collapse of 31 percent from 1929 until 1933 
and the number of banks operating cut roughly 
in half over 1925–1933, it is safe to conclude 
that the early Federal Reserve failed miserably 
at meeting its initial mandate of financial stabil-
ity. This failure led to the establishment of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
and its supervision mandate. During the course 
of the 1930s a relatively laissez-faire approach to 
financial markets (both domestically and inter-
nationally) gave way to a significant increase 
in the regulation of the financial industry and 
to the erection of barriers to the international 
flow of financial capital that were the hallmark 
of the now-defunct gold standard. This wave of 
financial   deglobalization, while somewhat more 
extreme, is not unlike the trends that have been 
set in motion by the recent crisis, especially in 
Europe. During this first era, the Fed did have 
multiple instruments at its disposal apart from 
setting interest rates. Unfortunately, some of 
these instruments of policy were employed 
 procyclically. For example, reserve requirements 
were doubled (from 13 to 26 percent) between 
1935 and 1937 in the midst of the Depression 
(see Table 1).
While substantial public debts were accu-
mulated during the 1930s (see Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2009), there is nothing in US history to 
match the debt build up that would accompany 
WWII. For about four decades (1939–1978) 
the Fed would remain largely subservient to 
the Treasury. Interest rates were capped, credit 
ceilings remained in place through the early 
1950s, and financial repression domestically and 
abroad ruled the day. Whatever distortions these 
policies may have led to in terms of the misal-
location of resources, it is important to note that 
from 1945 until the late 1970s there were no 
systemic banking crises in the United States or 
elsewhere. Such a long uninterrupted period of 
tranquility was a new phenomenon in the his-
tory of finance. Ultimately, sustained monetary 
policy accommodation combined with adverse 
supply shocks gave way to persistent inflation 
(see Figure 1) and ushered in the more recent 
era of an independent Fed with the restoration of 
price stability as its main mandate.
1
To understand the shift in mandate and focus 
of the Federal Reserve during 1979–2007, it is 
1 It has to be noted that what was achieved in the era of 
the “great moderation” was inflation stability—not price sta-
bility—as Figure 1 makes plain. MAY 2013 50 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
necessary to briefly review key features of its 
prior incarnations. The fact that the colossal fail-
ure of the 1930s gave rise to other institutions 
that took on supervisory responsibilities helped 
pave the way, in principle, for the Fed to focus 
more of its energy on the goal of inflation and 
countercyclical macroeconomic stabilization in 
the modern era. It is notable that post-WWII, 
the highly regulated financial markets with their 
intense home bias gave rise to only a few crises 
in advanced economies (especially in compari-
son to the panic-ridden prewar era). This quietus 
facilitated the view in both academic and policy 
circles that advanced economies had outgrown 
severe financial crises, and that these were a 
phenomenon confined to the emerging markets. 
In an environment where other supervisory insti-
tutions and financial markets were thought to be 
monitoring risk, the Fed mandate eventually 
narrowed to emphasize inflation and unemploy-
ment. As the mandate became more focused, 
older instruments of monetary policy were dis-
carded as distortionary and obsolete. Reserve 
and margin requirements as well as other poli-
cies designed to curb credit growth and lever-
age were relegated to history. Interest rate policy 
and communications strategies became the sole 
instruments of monetary policy.
In the next section, we suggest that irrespec-
tive of the changes in the Fed’s mandates, credit 
aggregates merit a larger role in setting policy 
and gauging financial conditions—especially if 
financial stability regains a more prominent role 
in policy design.
Table 1—Selected Timeline: 1913–2012
Selected
years
Legislative/regulation/
other
Financial 
crisis
Inflation 
performance
Real 
interest rates
Other 
policy
1913 Fed created
1914–1918 WWI- capital controls Equity crash Peak 18% −4.2% average War bond drive
1919–1929 Liberal financial markets Real estate crash 1.4% average 3.7% average
1931 2,031 bank closures Crisis peak −9% 11.6%
1932–1933 Glass-Steagall, FDIC 
 created, end of gold 
standard, onset of capital 
controls
−5 to −10% 6.8–12.2% 1935–1937, reserve 
requirements 
doubled
1939–1945 WWII- Bretton Woods 
agreement, 1944–1945
Peak 12.9% War bond drive & 
credit controls
1945– Financial repression & 
capital controls, heavy 
regulation of finance, 
1945–1980
Longest hiatus in 
crises, US &  
worldwide, 
1945–1980
−0.4% average Ceiling on t-bills
1951 Fed-Treasury Accord Fed independence
1970s Oil shocks Peak 14% −2.8 to 2%
1978–1979 Humphrey Hawkins Full 
Employment Act
0% average Stabilization starts 
October 1979
1980–1986 Financial liberalization— 
interest ceilings 
eliminated
S&L crisis 13.5 to 1.9% 4.5–6% Inflation 
stabilization
2000– Treasury purchases by 
foreign central banks 
skyrocket
Subprime onset 
2007
2.5% average 2% average 
1981–2007
2008–2012 QEs, Dodd-Frank, return 
of financial repression?
−1.6% average  Directed credit
Sources: Meltzer (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).VOL. 103 NO. 3 51 shifting mandates: the federal reserve’s first centennial
II.  Interest Rates and Credit
In the past three decades, the behavior and 
evolution of private credit has received compara-
tively little attention as an indicator of aggregate 
demand, inflationary pressures, or as a potential 
early warning of financial vulnerability. On the 
latter score, the key role of credit booms in antic-
ipating financial crises in advanced economies 
since the late nineteenth century is extensively 
documented by Schularick and Taylor (2012). 
The evidence for emerging markets presented in 
Mendoza and Terrones (2012) is equally com-
pelling; as they observe, not every credit boom 
ends in crisis, but nearly all crises are preceded 
by credit booms.
Here we present evidence that across time 
and regimes ranging from the relatively global-
ized and laissez-faire financial system of the 
“roaring 1920s” and pre-2007 crisis to the post-
WWII financial repression era, the behavior of 
credit has provided valuable and complemen-
tary information about the “de facto” stance of 
monetary policy (or, more accurately, monetary 
or liquidity conditions) to that incorporated in 
the short-term policy interest rate. To clarify, we 
follow the widely accepted convention that the 
intent to tighten/ease monetary policy is sig-
naled primarily through an increase/decrease in 
policy   interest rate(s) and that this intent defines 
“de jure” policy. Along those lines, Romer and 
Romer (1989) are more concerned with defin-
ing policy intent. Here we suggest that credit 
conditions may reenforce the changes in the 
policy interest rate at a given point in time, or 
they may counteract those changes. Thus de 
facto monetary or liquidity conditions may on 
occasion substantially differ from what might be 
perceived based on interest rates alone.
A. An Illustration for Consumer Credit: 
1919–2012
Given the depth of its equity, corporate bond, 
and commercial paper markets, the United States 
is considered to be the least bank-dependent 
economy in the world, at least when it comes 
to corporate finance. For households, however, 
banks play a dominant role in the United States 
as they do in other countries. Hence, our focus 
on   consumer credit here.
2 With a secular shift 
to an urban society since the early twentieth 
century, household credit as a share of dispos-
able income has risen steadily year after year, 
as part of what is often called financial deepen-
ing. As Figure 2 shows, since 1919 the nominal 
stock of consumer credit outstanding has shown 
substantial annual declines during only three 
episodes: the collapse of the banking system 
during the Great Depression, the credit rationing 
during World War II, and in 2009 at the height 
of the Subprime Crisis. While the most recent 
credit contraction is not as severe as the wartime 
or Depression credit collapses, a 4.3 percent 
decline in nominal consumer credit in 2009 is 
far removed from the 8.2 average yearly percent 
increase recorded over 1919–2012.
Since, as shown in Figure 2, only nine of the 
93 annual observations show a contraction in 
consumer credit (and these nine observations 
are clustered in three episodes), it will be more 
informative to describe credit conditions in 
terms of whether credit growth is accelerating 
or decelerating in a particular year. In addition, 
to describe whether monetary policy is tighter 
or more accommodative, we focus on the basis 
point change in interest rates in a given year. 
2 Consumer credit was also the main target of the credit 
ceiling policies of the 1940s–1980. 
Years of 
 major declines
1930–1933   Banking crisis/ tight monetary policy
1938      Double dip
1942–1943   Wartime credit rationing
2009      Financial crisis
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Figure 2. Change in Total Consumer Credit 
Outstanding, 1920–2012 
(end-of-period, annual percent change)
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Historical Statistics of the United States, and Reinhart and 
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Since 1955 we use the federal funds rate, while 
the discount rate fills that role over 1913–1954.
Our aim is to assess year by year whether the 
signals coming from credit tend to reenforce or 
offset the signals coming from interest rates. A 
year when the policy rate is declining and credit 
growth is accelerating is counted as an observa-
tion of unambiguous easing as both indicators 
of monetary conditions reenforce. With inter-
est rates being the primary instrument, a year 
in which rates are falling but credit growth is 
unchanged or decelerating is counted as mixed 
easing. A neutral to easier observation comes 
from a year where the policy interest rate is 
unchanged but credit growth is accelerating. 
Symmetric definitions apply for tightening.
The results of this accounting exercise for 
1921–2012 (92 years) are presented in Table 2.
Prior to examining the results, it is impor-
tant to highlight some of the limitations of the 
exercise. First, whether credit is accelerating 
or decelerating, each data point reflects a final 
outcome; further analysis would be required to 
sort out whether the observed outcome primar-
ily owes to supply or demand shifts. Second, 
we look at credit momentum and interest rate 
changes to characterize a particular year; their 
dynamic relationship is not explored. It is to be 
expected that sometimes rising interest rates will 
show up only in a deceleration in credit and only 
in the following year. Similarly, a credit boom 
in an overheated economy may lead to a delib-
erate policy tightening and rising policy inter-
est rates that do not immediately gain traction 
in credit markets. Third, while interest rates are 
taken to be the primary instrument (really the 
only instrument in the post-1980s financial lib-
eralization period), this was not always the case. 
Reserve requirement changes were also a part 
of the policy toolkit in an earlier era. Even more 
explicitly impacting credit was the past use of 
credit controls, as highlighted in Table 1. Credit 
controls were used during World War II, also in 
its immediate aftermath, and most recently in 
1980 under President Carter.
3
With these caveats in mind, we turn to the 
results presented in Table 2, which distributes 
the 92 annual observations into the seven buckets 
that range from unambiguously tight to unam-
biguously easy monetary or liquidity conditions. 
Note that less than a fourth (23 percent) of the 
observations fall into the two extreme unambig-
uous categories, where interest rates and credit 
3 Interestingly, the use of credit controls following WWII 
and again in 1980 was decidedly motivated by inflation sta-
bilization efforts rather than by concerns about rising lever-
age and its impact on financial stability. 
Table 2—Changes in Policy Interest Rates and Changes in Consumer Credit, 1921–2012
Interest rate/credit combination Number of years Share of years
unambiguous easing
  Declining interest rates and accelerating credit growth
8 8.7
mixed easing
  Declining interest rates and unchanged/decelerating credit growth
25 27.2
neutral to easier
  Unchanged interest rates and accelerating credit growth
12 13.0
neutral
  Unchanged interest rates and credit growth
2 2.2
neutral to tighter
  Unchanged interest rates and decelerating credit growth
11 12.0
mixed tightening
  Rising interest rates and unchanged/accelerating credit growth
21 22.8
unambiguous tightening
  Rising interest rates and decelerating credit growth
13 14.1
memorandum item
  Total number of years for which there is credit and policy rate data 92 100
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Historical Statistics of the United States, and Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009).VOL. 103 NO. 3 53 shifting mandates: the federal reserve’s first centennial
both send the same signal. Furthermore, this 
pattern does not vary across regimes, whether 
the regime is defined by the primary goal of the 
Federal Reserve at the time or by the degree of 
international capital mobility and/or domestic 
financial regulation.
Over a quarter of the time, when declining 
interest rates were signaling a more accommo-
dative monetary policy stance, credit was decel-
erating. This situation characterizes most of the 
post-2007 crisis years. In both 2008 and 2009 
interest rates fell sharply, yet, quantitative eas-
ing notwithstanding, consumer credit growth 
decelerated sharply. As noted earlier, one cannot 
definitely apportion the observed deceleration 
in credit between, for example, a tightening of 
lending standards versus weak demand due to 
weak consumer balance sheets and recession.
More than 23 percent of the time, rising policy 
interest rates are not accompanied by slowing 
credit (i.e., mixed tightening category). Several 
observations from the high inflation years of 
the 1970s fall in this bucket. Perhaps it owes 
to interest rate increases that were insufficient, 
only following or accommodating the rapid rise 
of inflation at that time. By contrast, Table 3, 
which lists the years where credit and the policy 
rate gave reenforcing signals, flags the famous 
Volcker anti-inflation tightening that began in 
October 1979. The double signal also captures 
the now notorious procyclical tightening in 1931 
that involved a 150 basis point increase in the 
discount rate alongside a 17 percent decelera-
tion in credit growth, which also makes the list. 
Notably, all the dates of unambiguous tightening 
map well onto the NBER’s dating of recessions, 
as these followed the policy change within one 
or two years. Years of unambiguous easing 
include 1933 and 1934 after the abandonment of 
the gold standard, 1983 (the Fed actually began 
lowering rates in August 1982), and the early 
1990s. Recent years do not figure in this list.
III.  Policy Implications: Back to the Future
In the post-crisis environment, the Federal 
Reserve is likely to attach a greater weight to 
a financial stability objective than it had prior 
to the crisis—at least for some time. Since the 
price stability and full employment goals have 
not been set aside, we call attention to the fact 
that multiple policy goals usually call for mul-
tiple instruments. Yet over the past three decades 
both the academic literature and the policy prac-
tice have increasingly drifted to a world view 
where the short-term policy rate is a sufficient 
policy instrument. The theoretical underpin-
nings supporting that view usually assume com-
plete markets, an assumption that is particularly 
at odds with a post-crisis environment riddled 
with a broad assortment of frictions arising 
from both market failures and a steady stream 
of complex regulatory changes set in motion 
by the crisis. In that environment, policies such 
as changes in reserve and margin requirements 
and a variety of credit measures that have been 
discarded as antiquated should again be part of 
the toolkit of central banks in the United States 
and other advanced economies, at least until a 
far more robust and effective regulatory super-
structure is firmly in place. As just one example, 
if the Federal Reserve had greater capacity to 
impose reserve requirements, today’s quantita-
tive easing policies would hold less exit risk, 
and correspondingly could be employed more 
aggressively.
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